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DALE D. GOBLE*
Prior Appropriation and the Property
Clause: A Dialogue of
Accommodation
The discovery of gold in California was followed, as is well
known, by an immense immigration into the State .... The
lands in which the precious metals were found belonged to the
United States, and were unsurveyed, and not open, by law, to
occupation and settlement. Little was known of them further
than that they were situated in the Sierra Nevada mountains.
Into these mountains the emigrants in vast numbers penetrated,
occupying the ravines, gulches, and cafions, and probing the
earth in all directions for the precious metals. Wherever they
went, they carried with them that love of order and system and
of fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our
people. In every district they occupied they framed certain rules
for their government, by which the extent of ground they could
severally hold for mining was designated, their possessory right
to such ground secured and enforced, and contests between then
either avoided or determined. These rules.. . recognized discov-
ery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation of the posses-
sor's title, and development by working as the condition of its
retention. And they were so framed as to secure to all comers,
within practical limits, absolute equality of right and privilege in
working the mines. Nothing but such equality would have been
tolerated by the miners, who were emphatically the law-makers,
as respects mining, upon the public lands in the State .... But
the mines could not be worked without water.... Here, also, the
first appropriator of water to be conveyed to such localities for
mining or other beneficial purposes, was recognized as having, to
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho. A.B., 1975 Columbia Coll.; J.D., 1978, Ore-
gon. The research for this article was partially funded by a University of Idaho College
of Law summer research stipend. Thanks to Doug Grant for his comments on an ear-
lier draft of this article.
This article is, of course, dedicated to Chapin Clark who despite the press of his
duties as dean found time to teach me water law-even if the time was 8:00 p.m.-and
he may now decide that he failed. There is not enough space to express my appreciation
for everything that Chapin has done for me and for the school of law.
[381]
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the extent of actual use, the better right.1
W ATER plays a key role in the founding myth of the West. In
Justice Field's telling of the tale, water made mining possi-
ble. For others, water was the stuff that brought the desert to
bloom; the tale was one of strong, self-reliant pioneers wresting a
life from the land made verdant by irrigation, bringing civilization
to the wilderness. Never mind that the grub-staked prospector had
only a brief moment before being replaced by the corporate and the
urban, 2 that the family farm was less common than the agribusi-
ness,3 that the westerner lived out of tin cans rather than on veni-
son,4 or that a "great deal of nonsense has been written (mostly in
judicial opinions) about the customary law of the mining camps as a
distinctive contribution to American jurisprudence."5 Cowboys
and Indians, gold and water-the myth of the sturdy emigrant is
one of the lasting contributions of the West to popular culture and
the law.6
But the West's contribution to water law-the prior appropria-
tion doctrine-has a mirage at its core, just like the shimmering
waters of the Great American Desert that danced before the pros-
pector and his cantankerous mule. While commentators have spent
much time praising, damning, and finally burying the prior appro-
priation doctrine,' the inherent tension between the local perspec-
I Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1878) (Field, J.); see also Basey v. Gallagher,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670, 683-84 (1874) (Field, J.); Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 507, 512-13 (1874) (Field, J.). The "love of order" did not, of course, prevent the
sturdy emigrants from trespassing on lands "not open, by law, to occupation." Jenni-
son, 98 U.S. at 457. For a different perspective, see Gordon M. Bakken, American
Mining Law and the Environment. The Western Experience, I W. LEGAL HIST. 211,
222-24 (1988).
2 E.g., RICHARD E. LINGENFELTER, THE HARDROCK MINERS: THE HISTORY OF
THE MINING LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 1863-1893 (1974). As Ber-
nard DeVoto noted, "The West... was born of industrialism." Bernard DeVoto, The
West: A Plundered Province, 169 HARPERS 355, 358 (1934).
3 E.g., DONALD J. PISANI, FROM FAMILY THE FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRI-
GATION CRUSADE IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST 1850-1931, at 14-15 (1984).
4 PATRICIAN. LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 17-18 (1987).
5 Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation, in PAUL W.
GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 699, 709 (1968).
6 On the contribution of the West to popular culture, see ROBERT WARSHOW, Movie
Chronicle: The Westerner, in THE IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE: MOVIES, COMICS, THEA-
TRE & OTHER ASPECTS OF POPULAR CULTURE 91 (Anchor Books ed. 1962). On its
contribution to the creation of "American mining law," see JOHN D. LESHY, THE MIN-
ING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 9-16 (1987). On the relationship between
water and mining, see RODMAN PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD (1947).
7 See, e.g., MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
(Vol. 71, 1992]
Prior Appropriation
tive of the prior appropriation rights and the national perspective of
the Property Clause of the United States Constitution has attracted
little attention. Yet, this tension has produced a dialogue between
the western states and the nation that has spanned more than a cen-
tury.' The primary participants in this conversation have been the
courts of the United States and the western states, which in their
opinions, and in their use of one another's opinions, have sought an
accommodation of both the national and the local.
This brief essay traces the dialogue that led to this accommoda-
tion, tying it into a broader dialogue that has focused on control of
nationally owned lands and their resources.9
I
NATIONAL LAND/STATE LAW: HONOR AMONG
THIEVES
Property rights, particularly those rights associated with land, are
generally creatures of state law,"0 the boundaries subject to state
definition and determination." Unlike most property, however, the
right to the use of water recognized under the prior appropriation
doctrine has a federalism problem at its core. This problem is
linked to the history of public lands.
As Justice Field noted, in the arid, western part of the United
States, courts erected a body of law that permitted water use rights
to be established through diverting water from a stream and apply-
ing it for beneficial use. Under this, the prior appropriation doc-
trine, water rights were predicated upon priority of diversion and
DISAPPEARING WATER (1986) (damning); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE:
WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985) (same); James
Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?, 36 OR. L. REV. 221 (1957) (prais-
ing); Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL.
L. at v (1991) (burying).
8 The national government still owns 46% of the land in the 11 western states. Bu-
REAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTIC 1989, at 5
(1990). In these states, the Property Clause gives the national government a potentially
significant role in water management decisions.
9 The history of the interpretation of the Property Clause and of the powers that it
confers on Congress is a history of conflict between national and state governments over
control of the resources located on federally owned lands. See Dale D. Goble, The
Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENVER U. L. REV. 495, 495-96
(1986). In the arid West, control of water has been a primary source of this conflict.
10 See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
372 (1977); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 496, 517 (1839).
II See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (looking to Wiscon-
sin law to define a property interest in employment).
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use-upon "appropriation" of the water. In requiring an appropri-
ation to establish a right, the doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent
with the common law, which treats water as an incident of the own-
ership of riparian land and recognizes correlative rights in all ripa-
rian landowners to a continued flow of the stream. 12
This inconsistency would have presented few jurisprudential
problems but for the fact that one of the first statutes enacted by the
territorial legislatures, in the territories that subsequently created
the prior appropriation doctrine, expressly adopted the "common
law of England" as the rule of decision for the courts.' 3 The prob-
lem was obvious: If the common law of England was the law, then
water rights were an incident of riparian real estate. As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court noted,
[H]ow it can be held that that which is an inseparable incident to
the ownership of land in the Atlantic states and the Mississippi
valley is not such an incident in this or any other of the Pacific
states, we are unable clearly to comprehend. It certainly cannot
be true that a difference in climatic conditions or geographical
position can operate to deprive one of a right of property vested
in him by a well-settled rule of common law. 1
4
The initial judicial decisions establishing the appropriation doc-
trine recognized the problem and responded by converting the issue
into a question of public land law. This resolution was itself the
result of the historical situation. As Justice Field's retelling of the
myth noted, the doctrine developed during the gold rushes, initially
in California and then throughout the West. Congress, caught in
the sectional dissension that produced the Civil War, did nothing.
As a result of federal inaction, those seeking land for mining or
other uses had no method of obtaining title and were thus trespass-
ers. The courts responded by developing land law based upon pos-
session. Priority of possession, although conferring no rights
12 Seegenerally DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1990)
(on the distinction between the prior appropriation and riparian doctrines).
13 For example, the California reception statute provides: "The common law of Eng-
land, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of
this State." CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 1982) (originally enacted in 1850); accord
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211 (West 1991) (originally enacted in 1861); IDAHO
CODE § 73-116 (1989) (originally enacted in 1864); accord United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Bramwell, 217 P. 332, 333-34 (Or. 1923) ("The common law of England
... has been adopted and is in force in [Oregon].").
14 Benton v. Johncox, 49 P. 495, 497 (Wash. 1897). As the court also noted, "The
necessities of one man, or of any number of men, cannot justify the taking of another's
property without his consent, and without compensation." Id.
[V/ol. 71, 1992]
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against the actual owner-the national government-nonetheless,
did establish the better right among trespassers.' 5 The California
Supreme Court, in the first decision approving the prior appropria-
tion doctrine, emphasized the status of the claimants. Since the
lands through which the stream runs "are a part of the public do-
main, to which there is no claim of private proprietorship," the
competing claimants could not challenge the diversion as unlawful
since "at the common law the diversion of water courses could only
be complained of by riparian owners."16
The state and territorial courts in the West were thus able to
avoid the apparent conflict between the appropriation doctrine and
15 As Justice Field, then a California rather than United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice, had previously written:
It is sometimes said, in speaking of the public lands, that there is a general
license from the United States to work the mines which these lands contain.
But this language, though it has found its way into some judicial decisions, is
inaccurate, as applied to the action, or, rather, want of action, of the govern-
ment. There is no license in the legal meaning of that term. A license ...
implies a permission .... It carries an interest in land, and arises only from
grant. The mineral ...is under the exclusive control of Congress, equally
with any other interest which the government possesses in land. But Congress
has adopted no specific action on the subject, and has left that matter to be
controlled by its previous general legislation respecting the public domain.
And it is from its want of specific action, from its passiveness, that the infer-
ence is drawn of a general license. The most which can be said is, that the
government has forborne to exercise its rights, but this forbearance confers no
positive right ....
It may be, and undoubtedly is, a very convenient rule, in determining con-
troversies between parties on the public lands, where neither can have absolute
rights, to presume a grant, from the government, of mines, water-privileges,
and the like, to the first appropriator; but such a presumption can have no
place for consideration against the superior proprietor.
Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 374-75 (1859), appeal dismissed sub nom.,
Mining Co. v. Boggs, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 304 (1865) (the only possible basis for jurisdic-
tion is the allegation of prior possession "[b]ut this allegation does not set up any au-
thority exercised under the United States in taking such possession"); see also Mallett v.
Uncle Sam Gold & Silver Mining Co., 1 Nev. 188, 202 (1865); Gold Hill Quartz Mining
Co. v. Ish, 5 Or. 104, 106 (1873). It was, and still is, illegal to occupy federal lands until
"duly authorized by law." Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 46, § 1, 2 Stat. 445, 445.
16 Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145-46 (1855). The decision also suggests that the
state had the authority-presumably as the owner of the water-to permit its diversion.
See id. at 146-47. This was the court's contemporaneous position on mines. The court
reasoned that at the common law, gold and silver mines were the exclusive property of
the crown: "[The states,] in virtue of their respective sovereignties, are entitled to the
jura regalia which pertained to the king at common law .... The mines of gold and
silver on the public lands are as much the property of this State, by virtue of her sover-
eignty, as are similar mines in the lands of private citizens." Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219,
226-27 (1853). The court subsequently rejected the state-ownership theory. Lux v.
Haggin, 10 P. 674, 721 (Cal. 1886).
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the common law riparian doctrine adopted by their legislatures by
treating the appropriation claims simply as possessory interests that
did not affect the proprietary interests of the actual owner. As such,
the possessors had no claim against the national government.
II
NATIONAL LAND/NATIONAL LAW: THE PROPERTY
CLAUSE
The Property Clause in Article IV of the United States Constitu-
tion grants Congress the power "to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States."' 7 In one of its first opinions con-
struing the Clause, the Supreme Court held that under the Clause
"power is vested in congress without limitation."'" In addition to
authorizing Congress to transfer all federal interests in a tract of
land, the Property Clause authorizes Congress to lease lands,' 9 re-
serve interests in lands,2° and impose conditions on grants.2' In
short, the Clause confers all powers traditionally associated with
the ownership of land.
But the Property Clause does more than delegate proprietary
powers to Congress. Even before the gold rush era, the Supreme
Court had held that the Clause also conferred sovereign powers on
the national government. Most importantly, the Clause had been
held to confer the power on Congress to create territorial govern-
ments and courts. 22  Similarly, because of the Property and
Supremacy Clauses, questions concerning the nature of the interests
conveyed by a federal patent are questions of national rather than
state law. 23 Therefore, state law does not determine when title to
17 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
18 United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (retention of
mineral estate under right of way conveyed in 1862 statute).
21 The intent of Congress to convey or withhold a specific interest is controlling:
It cannot be denied that all lands in the Territories... are in the first instance
the exclusive property of the United States, to be disposed of to such persons,
at such times, and in such modes, and by such titles, as the Government may
deem most advantageous to the public fisc, or in other respects most politic.
Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558, 561-62 (1857); see also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 496, 517 (1839).
2 2 E.g., American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828);
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819).
23 "[W]henever the question in any court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land
which had once been property of the United States has passed, that question must be
[V/ol. 71, 1992]
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national lands has vested in private individuals,24 nor what interests
have been conveyed by the patent.25 Public domain lands, as inci-
dents of national sovereignty, were different than all other lands
within a state's boundaries because the rights associated with those
lands were determined by national rather than state law.
Under this general principle of public land law, the nature of the
interest conveyed by the federal patent to riparian lands was a ques-
tion of national law. Since trespassers acquired no interest against
the government," in the absence of a reservation in a subsequent
grant, the federal patent conveyed the unencumbered fee. This re-
mained a theoretical problem until the proprietor began to convey
land to private individuals under the Homestead Act of 1862.27
The problem was pressing because the Act, while establishing a
method for obtaining patents to lands, was silent on water rights.
Conveyance of the federal title, therefore, rendered any existing
possessory interests, including possessory rights to water based
upon priority of appropriation, uncertain; if common law water
rights were an incident of the ownership of riparian land, federal
grantees obtained such rights as an incident of their patent, and ap-
propriation-based interests were subject to defeasance by a subse-
quent patent. This was the conclusion of the initial judicial
decisions pitting riparian patentees against prior appropriators. In
the most widely noted case, the Nevada Supreme Court applied the
logic of the earlier decisions recognizing possessory claims, and held
for the subsequent patentee. The court reasoned that, since the ap-
propriator was a trespasser, he "could acquire no right against the
United States" because "[n]o presumption of grant arises against
the sovereign, and no statute of limitation runs.",28 Therefore, the
court found that when the United States issued the patent, it had
the unincumbered fee of the soil, its instances and appurtenances;
that was passed to Haines, there being no reservation in his pat-
resolved by the laws of the United States." Wilcox, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 517; see also
Irvine, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 563.
24 Wilcox, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 516-17; Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436,
450 (1839).
25E.g., Irvine, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 561-62; Wilcox, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 517.
26 "[N]o trespass ... can give title to the trespasser, as against the United States, or
bar the right of recovery .... Having the power of disposal and of protection, Congress
alone can deal with the title, and no state law, whether limitations or otherwise, can
defeat such title." Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 168, 184 (1846).
27 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, repealed by Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787.
28 Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 256 (1872).
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ent, and none is suggested. He became owner of the soil, and its
incidents thereto, had the right to the benefit to be derived from
the flow of the water therethrough; and no one could lawfully
divert it against his consent.29
The earlier conversion of the issue into a public land law question
created a significant problem; the question of riparian versus appro-
priation rights became one of federal rather than state law. Enforc-
ing the appropriation rights of trespassers against federal patentees
was either an attempt by the western states and territories to define
the interests conveyed by the federal patent or a taking of private
property.
III
NATIONAL LAND/NATIONAL LAW: CONGRESS TO
THE RESCUE?
Responding to the need for revenue to pay the Civil War debt,
Congress in 1864 began a debate on disposition of the publicly
owned mineral lands. This debate led to the enactment in 1866 of
the first of three statutes that Congress adopted over the next
twenty years that dealt obliquely with western water rights. This
first statute was the 1866 version of what has come to be known as
the General Mining Law."° Section 9 of the Act provided,
[W]henever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agriculture, manufacturing, or other purposes, have
vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowl-
edged by the local customs, laws, and decisions of courts, the
possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained
and protected in the same.
3 1
In 1870, Congress amended the Mining Law and extended the pri-
ority water rights
to all public lands affected by this act; and all patents granted, or
2 9 Id.; see also Ison v. Nelson Mining Co., 47 F. 199, 201 (C.C.D. Or. 1891); Union
Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 24 F. Cas. 590, 590 (C.C.D. Nev. 1873) (No. 14,370);
Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferris, 24 F. Cas. 594, 595 (C.C.D. Nev. 1873) (No.
14,371). Vansickle was subsequently overruled by Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev.
1885); see also Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317
(Nev. 1889).
30 Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 51
and 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1988)). On its enactment, see generally Swenson, supra note 5, at
714-19.
31 § 9, 14 Stat. at 253. The debate in the Congress makes no mention of the water law
provisions of the Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3225-37, 3451-54, 3141-
42, 4021-22, 4048-54 (1866).
[Vol. 71, 1992]
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pre-emption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reser-
voirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have
been acquired under or recognized by the [1866] act.3 2
The third statute was the Desert Land Act of 1877.13 In addition to
authorizing the sale of desert lands, this act provided that all unap-
propriated waters of nonnavigable streams on the public domain
"shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the
public ... subject to existing rights.",
34
These federal statutes embodied a message to the West: " 'Take
it-take it all, if you can. This is the American century. Progress
will result.' ""
While the pro-development message was clear and warmly re-
ceived, nagging questions remained. The statutes subordinated fed-
eral interests to state created interests only in limited circumstances.
The provisions in the General Mining Law, for example, subjected
federal patents only to those appropriative claims that had "vested
and accrued" before the patent was issued.36 Thus, the patentee's
property rights, including his common law water rights if he were a
riparian owner, were presumptively superior to those of subsequent
appropriators. Similarly, the Desert Land Act's declaration that
waters on the public lands were "free for appropriation and use"
was explicitly "subject to existing rights." '37 Most importantly, the
32 Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. § 52 and 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1988)). The congressional debate does not refer to the
water law provisions of the Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2027-30,
4402-04 (1870).
33 Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-
339 (1988)).
34 Id. § 1. The debate on the bill was extremely perfunctory and makes no mention
of the water law provisions, which were added in the Conference Committee. See 5
CONG. REC., 2156, 2225 (1877).
35 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at ix.
36 The language is found in both Acts. See § 17, 16 Stat. at 218; § 9, 14 Stat. at 253.
37 43 U.S.C. § 321. Furthermore, the Act's provisions when read as a whole are am-
biguous and their scope is limited:
[T]he right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same, on or to
any tract of desert land .. .shall depend upon bona fide appropriation: and
such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and
necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation; and all surplus
water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the
water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public
lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation
and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes sub-
ject to existing rights.
Id. Does the Act subject the claims of other, non-Desert Land Act entrymen to those
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statutes did not demonstrate an intent to transfer to the states the
power to define the process through which water rights were to be
acquired. Indeed, the legislative intent seemed just the opposite;
Congress chose to retain the power to define the interests included
in a federal patent. Furthermore, Congress' definition carved out
only a limited number of situations in which appropriation rights
were to supercede riparian rights; the statutes were at best a quit-
claim to a limited set of possessory rights.3"
Thus, beneath the pro-development message lay a darker core of
uncertainty: What was the relationship between appropriators and
federal patentees? Were appropriations good only against subse-
quent patentees? Were appropriations good only on the public do-
main? Finally, the fact that statutes could be repealed created
another concern: What Congress gives, it can also take away.
IV
NATIONAL LAND/STATE LAW: A STATE
PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
(JURISPRUDENTIAL RATIONALIZATIONS)
The ambiguities and surrounding uncertainties were of more than
idle concern because the national government was the region's dom-
inant landowner. One common state court response was denial: "If
any consent of the general government was primarily requisite to the
inception of the rule of prior appropriation, that consent is to be
found in several enactments by Congress, beginning with the act of
July 26, 1866, and including the desert-land act of March 3,
1877.''39 This response had two apparent shortcomings. First, it
failed to address the uncertainties created by the federal statutes.
For example, since the statutes reserved only prior appropriations
from the interests conveyed by a federal patent, did a riparian pat-
of the Act? The Act only makes the water beyond the Act's entrymen's needs "free."
Can uses other than irrigation, mining, and manufacturing appropriate water?
38 [B]y the congressional acts [of 1866 and 1870] the government merely said
that whenever it had acquiesced in asserted possessory rights on the public
domain which were upheld by local customs and law and decisions of the
courts, as between the possessors themselves, it would treat those possessors as
though they had acquired prescriptive rights against the government, and
would recognize such rights whenever afterwards granting patents to any part
of its land.
Cave v. Tyler, 65 P. 1089, 1090 (Cal. 1901).
39 Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 265 (Wyo. 1900) (emphasis added); see also




entee prevail in a contest with a subsequent appropriator? Second,
regardless of the interpretation given the federal statutes, there re-
mained those riparian patentees who had received their federal
grants before 1866. What interests did such patentees hold?
The press of litigation on such issues led the state courts to seek a
jurisprudential rationale for the conclusion that state based private
interests are uniformly superior to any water rights a federal pat-
entee might possess. While agreeing on the conclusion, the states
differed on the rationale. Two theories developed in the period im-
mediately following the enactment of the federal statutes.
The first and most extreme theory originated in Colorado. In
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co. ,4 the Colorado Supreme Court laid
down three propositions: first, due to the aridity of the American
West, the right to use water never had been an incident of land
ownership; second, the national government had no greater prop-
erty rights than any other proprietor; and third, those rights were
determined by state law. These propositions led inexorably to the
conclusion that the national government's property interests in the
public domain did not include riparian water rights and, therefore,
its patents did not convey such rights.4 The Colorado doctrine
thus asserts a state power to determine the scope of the rights con-
veyed by a federal patent; unlike the public domain of the United
States in the more humid Mississippi Valley, the public domain
within Colorado did not include common law riparian water
rights.4 Under this view, the federal acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877
were at best a "recognition" of state authority43 and at worst simply
nullities.
40 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
41 [The doctrine of prior appropriation] has existed from the date of the earliest
appropriations of water within the boundaries of the state. The climate is dry,
and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, is arid and unproduc-
tive . . . Water . . . thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates.
Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when appropriated, to the
dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property .... It is entitled
to protection as well after patent to a third party of the land over which the
natural stream flows, as when such land is part of the public domain; and it is
immaterial whether or not it be mentioned in the patent and expressly ex-
cluded from the grant.
Id. at 446-47; see also Sternberger v. Seaton Mountain Elec. Light, Heat, & Power Co.,
102 P. 168 (Colo. 1909); Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 113 P. 823 (N.M.
1911); Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210 (Wyo. 1903); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845 (Wyo.
1896).
42 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (quoting Benton v. Johncox, 49 P. 495,
497 (Wash. 1897)).
4 3
E.g., Willey, 73 P. at 216.
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A second theory was crafted by the California Supreme Court in
Lux v. Haggin." Starting from the proposition that prior to state-
hood the national government had been both proprietor and sover-
eign over the territory that became California, the court concluded
that the admission of the state into the Union upon an equal footing
with the original thirteen states45 made it the sovereign but con-
ferred no proprietary powers on the state. As sovereign, however,
the state was empowered to determine the scope of all property
rights-national as well as private: "The lands of the United States
... are held, since the admission of the state into the Union, as are
held the lands of private persons."" The national government's
water rights, therefore, are determined by state law. Since the state,
however, had adopted the common law and that law included ri-
parian rights, the three federal statutes were viewed as grants by the
riparian landowner to appropriators; subsequent federal patentees
took subject to "vested and accrued" appropriative rights.47
Although the two theories reach the same conclusion, they differ
in their view of the relationship between national and state powers.
Both theories resolve the dilemma created by the existence of the
prior appropriation doctrine and the presumptive common-law in-
terest conveyed to the federal patentee by establishing that state law
defined the interests conveyed by the federal patent. They differ,
however, on the point in time at which state law becomes supreme.
The Colorado theory assumes the complete supremacy of state-cre-
ated rights over federal rights; under Colorado law, riparian rights
never existed. Thus, the federal government as proprietor never
possessed riparian rights and it therefore could not convey such
rights to its grantees. The California theory, on the other hand,
acknowledges that prior to statehood the national government had
the power to define the interests that were incident to its land. This
power, however, passed to the state upon its admission into the
Union on an equal footing with the original states.
The Colorado and California theories are examples of a recurrent
44 10 P. 674, 719 (Cal. 1886).
45 Id.
46 Id. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens
of Modern Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485 (1986).
47 Lux, 10 P. at 726. Since the national government-like any private proprietor-
could dispose of the land and water separately, the 1866 and 1870 statutes were con-
strued as granting property rights to take effect when the appropriator complies with
applicable state law. Such grants are expressly excepted from the interests conveyed by
any subsequent patent. Id. at 724-28.
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dispute between national and state governments over the disposition
of the public domain and its resources. These states seek to estab-
lish the legal tenet that the national government as a proprietor is
like all other proprietors; the boundaries and content of its proprie-
tary interests are defined by state law.48 The Property Clause, in
other words, confers no governmental power over federal land-at
least once that land is included within a state.4 9
V
NATIONAL LAND/NATIONAL LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RESPONSE
This dispute between national and state power over the public
lands has a lengthy history. Since the creation of the current na-
tional government, individual states have sought to control the pub-
lic lands within their borders. Such state claims have met national
resistance. ° The recurrent state claims have been consistently re-
jected by the United States Supreme Court. One early example
serves to define the dispute. In Wilcox v. Jackson," the plaintiff
sought to maintain an ejectment action against the United States
based upon a Land Office Register's certificate, a pre-patent stage in
acquiring federal land, that he had purchased. Under Illinois law, a
certificate could serve as the basis for an ejectment action and the
48 See Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues
Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); David E.
Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 283 (1976);
Robert E. Hardwicke, et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L.
REV. 398 (1948); C. Perry Patterson, The Relationship of the Federal Government to the
Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949); Louis Touton,
Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 817 (1980). Contra Goble, supra note 9.
4 9 This is the primary difference between the Colorado and California theories; Colo-
rado asserts the supremacy of local law prior to statehood, while California asserts
supremacy only after statehood.
50 See generally Goble, supra note 9. The Sagebrush Rebellion of the late 1970s is
only the most recent example of this recurrent conflict. See John D. Leshy, Unraveling
the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317
(1980). The earliest explicit statement of the argument that I have found is in an ad-
dress by Ninian Edwards, Governor of Illinois, to the Illinois General Assembly. See
Ninian Edwards, Address before the Illinois General Assembly (Dec. 2, 1828), in JOUR-
NAL OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 6th Assembly, 1st Sess., at 10-39
(Kaskaskia ed., 1829); cf. Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 261 (1872) (Lewis, C.J.)
("Although it has sometimes been suggested that the unoccupied lands belonged to the
several states in which they may be located, the suggestion has never received the seri-
ous sanction of statesmen, or the courts of the country.").
51 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839).
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plaintiff argued that the state had the power to declare what was
sufficient evidence of title. The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment in broad language:
[B]y the laws of the United States the legal title has not passed,
but remains in the United States. Now, if it were competent for a
state legislature to say, that notwithstanding this, the title shall
be deemed to have passed; the effect of this would be, not that
congress has the power of disposing of the public land .. .but
that Illinois possessed it. That would be to make the laws of
Illinois paramount to those of congress, in relation to a subject
confided by the constitution to congress only.52
This position had been reaffirmed by the Court as recently as
1871 in a decision that extended protection to federal grantees. The
Court held that the power conferred on Congress by the Property
Clause not only precludes states from interfering with its power "to
prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode" of transferring
title, but also "forbids any legislation depriving the grantees of the
United States of the possession and enjoyment of the property
granted."53
The subordination of the proprietary rights of the national gov-
ernment under both the California and Colorado theories thus was
inconsistent with a fair reading of existing Supreme Court decisions.
Nonetheless, the two theories did raise the issue of the respective
powers of national and state governments in a new context since
they sought to remove only one interest-water rights-from the
bundle of rights and claims called "property."
A. Water Law (phase i)
It was not until the 1870s that the Supreme Court was finally
presented with a case that required it to determine the relationship
between national land law and possessory claims such as those cre-
ated under the prior appropriation doctrine.54 The Court re-
sponded by constructing the charming, Jeffersonian myth that
introduces this Article; the romantic vision of sturdy emigrants who
52 1d. at 516-17; see also Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450 (1839); cf.
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 538 (1840) ("[Illinois] surely cannot
claim a right to the public lands within her limits.").
53 Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99-100 (1871).
54 Prior to the enactment of the mining laws, the Court had recognized that posses-
sory mining claims could be considered "property" at least to the extent that they satis-
fied the jurisdictional amount necessary for the Court to hear ejectment actions for such
claims. See, e.g., Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97, 99-100 (1865); see also Min-
ing Co. v. Boggs, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 304, 307-08 (1865).
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"carried with them that love of order and system and of fair dealing
which are the prominent characteristics of our people" and who
established a customary law predicated upon "absolute equality of
right and privilege" so that "the first appropriator of water.., was
recognized as having, to the extent of actual use, the better right."55
Initially, the national government, "by its silent acquiesence, as-
sented" to the development of this customary law.56 Formal ap-
proval came in the 1866 Act, which was intended "to give the
sanction of the United States, the proprietor of the lands, to posses-
sory rights, which had previously rested solely upon the local cus-
toms, laws, and decisions of the courts, and to prevent such rights
from being lost on a sale of the lands."57
Despite its expansive rhetoric, the Court was careful to limit its
holdings by noting that the cases involved disputes between tres-
passers claiming only possessory rights. For example, in Basey v.
Gallagher,"8 the Court was presented with a dispute between appro-
priators to the flow of a stream. In deciding that priority of appro-
priation conferred the better right, the Court noted,
[N]either party has any title from the United States; no question
as to the rights of riparian proprietors can therefore arise. It will
be time enough to consider those rights when either of the parties
has obtained the patent of the government. At present, both par-
ties stand upon the same footing; neither can allege that the other
is a trespasser against the government without at the same time
invalidating his own claim. 59
The Court's careful qualifications tracked the then-current dis-
tinction between possessory and proprietary interests in the public
domain. Priority was to be protected among conflicting possessory
claims and against subsequent federal patentees to the extent that
Congress had recognized the validity of the claims. But such pos-
sessory interests created no independent rights against the proprie-
tary interests of the government.'
55 Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1878) (Field, J.).
56 Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507, 512 (1874) (Field, J.); see also Basey
v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670, 683-84 (1874) (Field, J.).5 7 Jennison, 98 U.S. at 457; see also Basey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 682; Atchison, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) at 513-24.
58 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670.
59 Id. at 681; see also Atchison, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 510-11.
6 0 E.g., Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 762-63, 766-67 (1876); Atchison, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) at 5 10-11; Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 24 F. Cas. 590, 590 (C.C.D.
Nev. 1873) (No. 14,370); Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferris, 24 F. Cas. 594, 595
(C.C.D. Nev. 1872) (No. 14,371); Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 256 (1872); Irwin v.
Phillips, 5 Cal. 141, 145- 46 (1855); cf. The Yosemite Valley Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77,
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The question of the relationship of appropriation and riparian
rights when title has passed from the government that the Court
carefully reserved in Basey v. Gallagher was directly presented in an
1890 case, Sturr v. Beck.6 The case involved an appropriation of
water across lands within the patent of a prior riparian home-
steader. The Court held that the appropriation was ineffective:
When ... the government ceases to be the sole proprietor, the
right of the riparian owner attaches, and cannot be subsequently
invaded.... [T]he riparian owner has the right to have the water
flow ut currere solebat, undiminished except by reasonable con-
sumption of upper proprietors, and no subsequent attempt to
take the water only can override the prior appropriation of both
land and water.62
Thus, at the close of the 1890 term, the Supreme Court had de-
cided that, while priority of possession determined rights among
trespassers, it conferred no right against the national government
or, by logical extension, against a patentee of the national govern-
ment. Rights against the government and its patentees were deter-
mined under the statutes that Congress had adopted. Since these
statutes spoke only of "vested and accrued water rights,"163 an ap-
propriation made after a patent had been issued did not confer
rights against the patentee.
B. Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch...
Parallel developments were occurring in litigation involving other
resources on the public domain. The use of federal lands for graz-
ing offers the most apt analogy. Again, there was a well-established
87 (1872) ("[M]ere occupation and improvement of any portion of the public lands...
do not confer upon the settler any right in the land occupied, as against the United
States ...."). The Court's careful qualifications were, however, overlooked by the state
courts, which preferred the myth. The most frequently reiterated language came from
Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879): "We are of the opinion that the [1866
act] ... was rather a voluntary recognition of a pre-existing right ofpossession, constitut-
ing a valid claim to its continued use, than the establishment of a new one." Overlooked
was the fact that the Court was construing a statute granting a railroad lands and that
the statute protected any "lawful claim" and "the improvements of any bona fide set-
tler." Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, § 4, 13 Stat. 356, 358 (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541,
543-44 (Idaho 1890); Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210 (Wyo. 1903). But see Lux v. Haggin,
10 P. 674, 726-28, 729-30 (Cal. 1886).
61 133 U.S. 541 (1890).
62 Id. at 551; see also Bybee v. Oregon & Cal. R.R., 139 U.S. 663, 680 (1891) (appro-
priation after effective date of statute granting lands to railroad was ineffective under the
1866 Act).
63 § 17, 16 Stat. at 218; § 9, 14 Stat. at 253.
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common law rule: "[E]very man must restrain his stock within his
own grounds, and if he does not do so, and they get upon the unen-
closed grounds of his neighbor, it is a trespass for which their owner
is responsible."'  That rule, however, also was "ill-adapted to the
nature and conditions of the country" because of "the scarcity of
means for enclosing lands, and the great value of the use of the
public domain for pasturage";65 and, once again, the states adopted
laws reversing the common law and requiring the landowner to
fence out livestock.66 Thus, the grazing custom that developed in
the American west corresponded to the customary water law; both
reversed a common law rule to allow individuals to exploit a re-
source on the public domain without formal approval of the propri-
etor, the national government.
In considering the grazing cases, the Court held, as it had in the
mining and water cases, that the long-standing acquiesence of the
government conferred
an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly a hun-
dred years, that the public lands of the United States, especially
those in which the native grasses are adapted to the growth and
fattening of domestic animals, shall be free to the people who
seek to use them where they are left open and unenclosed, and no
act of government forbids this use.
6 7
This presumed national policy of equal access was reinforced by the
various state fence-out statutes. After reviewing such statutes, the
Court denied a request to enjoin a sheepherder from grazing his
flock on a cattleman's checkerboard railroad lands.68 To allow the
injunction, the Court noted, would frustrate both policies by al-
lowing the cattleman to obtain a monopoly over the entire tract.6 9
The national policy of open and equal access could, however, be
overridden by state law. In 1875, Idaho enacted a statute preclud-
ing the grazing of sheep within two miles of any dwelling.70 The
effect of the statute was to close large areas of public domain to
sheep and transfer the forage on it to cattle. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute noting that "[t]he laws and policy of a State may
64 Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
65 Id. at 328; see also Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425, 427-29 (1880).
66 See Buford, 133 U.S. at 328-29.
6 7
1d. at 326.
68 Id. at 325; see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911) (recounting
similar facts and history).
69 Buford, 133 U.S. at 332.
70 Sweet v. Ballentyne, 69 P. 995, 996 (Idaho 1902); see also Sifers v. Johnson, 65 P.
709, 709 (Idaho 1901).
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be framed and shaped to suit its conditions of climate and soil."'71
Following this decision, the state extended the law to prohibit the
grazing of sheep on any range previously grazed by cattle; this ex-
tension was upheld by the Court in Omaechevarria v. Idaho 72 with
the cursory statement that "[t]he police power of the State extends
over the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation
by Congress on the subject."
73
State laws, whether requiring landowners to fence out livestock in
contravention of the common law or allocating federal forage
among competing claimants, thus provided the applicable law, at
least until Congress chose to act. However, neither the "implied
license," nor the state law, conferred "any vested right" on private
individuals or "deprive[d] the United States of the power of recal-
ling any implied license under which the land had been used for
private purposes." 4 Congress, therefore, had the power to establish
"forest reserves" and close the reserved lands to grazing. 75 Further-
more, the state fence law could not shield the cattleman from being
enjoined from allowing his cattle to graze on the reserve after refus-
ing to obtain a permit from the Forest Service.76
The most significant difference between the customary law of
water and the customary law of grazing was that water law created
individual interests based upon priority of use while grazing law did
not.77 The different results are traceable to Congress and the differ-
ences between the General Mining Law and the Unlawful In-
closures Act of 1885.78 Because Congress recognized the validity of
possessory claims to water in the General Mining Law, the Court
had to struggle to reconcile those claims with its Property Clause
jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Unlawful Inclosures Act
71 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 315 (1907).
72 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
73 Id. at 346.
74 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
75 Id., 220 U.S. at 535-38.
76 Id. at 535, 537-38; cf. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,
403-05 (1917) (the right to use public lands for rights of way is determined by national
rather than state law).
77 E.g., McGinnis v. Friedman, 17 P. 635 (Idaho 1888) (relying upon the Unlawful
Inclosures Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1988), to deny a prior possession claim for
grazing rights); Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. McIlquam, 83 P. 364, 369 (Wyo.
1905) ("Priority of use as to such pasturage does not create a priority of right."). Users
were, however, able to circumvent part of this problem through state statutes allocating
forage among competing claimants, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text, or
through physical intimidation. See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
78 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066.
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precluded "the assertion of a right to the exclusive use and occu-
pancy of any part of the public lands of the United States,"' 79 rein-
forcing the existing case law and denying graziers any private claim
to forage. The Supreme Court's analysis of both grazing law and
water law is consistent in the following respect: Congress alone had
the power to dispose of interests in the public lands and its choice
was to be upheld.8°
A broad congruence thus existed between the public land law of
grazing and the public land law of water. Federal acquiesence in
private use of resources located on public lands conferred no legal
rights against the national government; the national government's
silence gave rise only to an implied license. But the national gov-
ernment's silence allowed state law to allocate resources and settle
disputes among competing licensees.
C. Water Law (phase ii)
At this point, however, the Court appears to pause, reassess the
implications of these decisions, and then seemingly to change direc-
tion. In the decade following 1899, the Court decided five cases
that sought to balance the conflicting claims of national and local
law. 8' The Court's rationale is best captured in a statement it made
in a decision upholding a private right to condemn land for ditches.
All but echoing Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous aphorism on "the
79 1d. § 1061.
80 Thus, for example, the Court upheld an injunction against the maintenance of a
carefully constructed fence that effectively enclosed some 20,000 acres of public lands.
The fence builder argued that the Unlawful Inclosure Act was unconstitutional if con-
strued to preclude the fence because it was located entirely on private land. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding,
[Congress has] the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands,
though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the
police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection. A
different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely
at the mercy of state legislation.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897); see also McKelvey v. United
States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922) (upholding provision of Unlawful Inclosure Act precluding
the use of intimidation to prevent use); cf United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267
(1927) ("Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that im-
peril the publicly owned forests.").
81 The five cases are: Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Kansas v. Colo-
rado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Guitierres v. Albuquer-
que Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545 (1903); United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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life of the law,' '8 2 the Court stated, "This court must recognize the
difference of climate and soil, which render necessary these different
laws in the States so situated." 3 At the same time, however, such
differences did not require the abandonment of national interests to
state control. These twin strands are present in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. , the first of the cases decided during
this second phase of the evolution of the accommodation of national
and local.
Rio Grande Dam involved one of those grand schemes for remak-
ing the entire landscape that has marked so much of western water
law. The Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company intended to
construct a dam across the Rio Grande to " 'create the largest artifi-
cial lake in the world'" and to give the company "'control of the
entire flow of the ... Rio Grande and divert and use the [river for]
irrigating large bodies of land, and to supply water for cities and
towns, and for domestic and municipal purposes, and for milling
and mechanical power... .' "85 The United States sought to enjoin
the construction to protect the downstream navigability of the river.
The Court began its analysis with the "unquestioned rule of the
common law" that "every riparian owner was entitled to the contin-
ued natural flow of the stream."8 6 The Court acknowledged that "it
is also true that as to every stream within its dominion a State may
change this common law rule and permit the appropriation of the
flowing waters . ,,.." The states' power to change the common
law rule is, however, limited by the national government's proprie-
tary interests: "[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress
a State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the United
States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the contin-
ued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the
82 "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
83 Clark, 198 U.S. at 370; cf. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 127
(1905):
[I]t must be observed that this legislation [the 1866 Act] was enacted by Con-
gress more than thirty years ago.... Property rights have been built up on
the faith of it. To now strike it down would unsettle countless titles and work
manifold injury to the great mining interests of the Far West. While, of
course, consequences may not determine a decision, yet in a doubtful case the
court may well pause before thereby it unsettles interests so many and so vast
84 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
8 5 Id. at 691 (quoting Pl's. Am. Compl.).86 Id. at 702.
87 Id. at 702-03.
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beneficial uses of the government property.""8 In short, while a
state may adopt the appropriation doctrine and apply it to private
lands within its jurisdiction, the state may not divest the federal
government of its rights as a riparian landowner.
The Court based its decision on the 1866 and 1877 federal stat-
utes: "Obviously by these acts... Congress recognized and assented
to the appropriation of water in contravention of the common law
rule as to continuous flow."' 89 As the Court explained in subsequent
decisions, these statutes were exceptions to the general requirement
that property rights in federal lands could be acquired only through
federal patents. Instead, these statutes authorized the creations of
rights through compliance with local law.9" This did not mean,
however, that local law could deprive the United States of its supe-
rior rights under either the Commerce Clause or the Property
Clause. 9
Subsequent opinions emphasized one or the other side of the ac-
commodation. In Kansas v. Colorado,92 the Court stressed the
power of a state to "determine for itself whether the common law
rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in
the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the
purposes of irrigation shall control."93 Congress, the Court stated,
"cannot enforce either rule upon any State ' 94 since upon admission
into the Union each state is "admitted with the full powers of local
sovereignty which belonged to other States."95 The next year, in
Winters v. United States,96 the Court reemphasized the limitation
on state-created interests that conflicted with national claims: "The
power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not
8 8 d. at 703. The Court also held that a state's power to allow appropriation of
waters was subject to the "superior power" of Congress to protect navigation. Id.
89 Id. at 706. The United States eventually obtained a permanent injunction against
the project, but not before returning twice to the Supreme Court. See Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 266 (1909); United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 184 U.S. 416 (1902).
9 0 E.g., Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545, 552-53
(1903).
91 See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Guitierres, 188 U.S.
at 554-55.
92 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
93 Id. at 94.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
96 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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be." 97 The reservation of waters arose by "implication" from the
language of a treaty with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Indian
Nations.
98
Thus, by 1910 the general outlines of an accommodation had
been sketched in. State law determined private rights within the
state whether on private or federal lands. This dominance of state
law over federal proprietary interests resulted from federal statutes
granting that power to local law. 99 State law, however, did not limit
federal rights beyond the provisions of the 1866, 1870, and 1877
statutes.
The Supreme Court thus rejected the Colorado theory that ripar-
ian rights had never existed in the arid West. Not only had such
rights existed, but they continued to exist "so far at least as may be
necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property."''°
The Court also rejected the central proposition of both the Califor-
nia and Colorado theories that the national government was a pro-
prietor whose proprietary interests were determined by local law.
National interests were determined by local law, the Court con-
cluded, only to the extent that Congress chose to subordinate the
national interests. This left the unresolved issue: To what extent
were federal rights subordinated by the 1866, 1870, and 1877
statutes?
VI
NATIONAL LAND/STATE LAW: SEVERING WATER
FROM LAND
Near the end of this flurry of Supreme Court decisions, a third
state theory on the relation between the appropriation doctrine and
the Property Clause was announced by the Oregon Supreme
Court.'' The court began with the proposition that national pro-
prietary rights, including riparian water rights, were not affected by
statehood; federal law remained supreme: "The right of the govern-
ment to dispose of its public lands, and to deal with all rights inci-
dent thereto, in such a manner as it may deem best, has long been
97 Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
9 8 1d. at 575-76.
99 The constitutionality of using state legislation to establish rules for the disposition
of federal proprietary interests was upheld in a case challenging the permissibility of the
1866 Act's delegation of power to mining districts and the state. Butte City Water Co.
v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1905).
100 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
101 Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083, reh'g denied, 102 P. 728 (Or. 1909).
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fully established and recognized by all decisions upon the sub-
ject."' 10 2 Thus, the question is one of the proprietor's intent. The
court found this intent expressed in the Desert Land Act, °3 which
it construed as granting the public the right to appropriate the wa-
ters on the public domain:
This unquestioned power of the owner over the public domain
was exercised, and any one entering upon, and acquiring title to,
any part of the public domain after the passage of [the Desert
Land Act of 1877] accepted such land and title thereto with full
knowledge of the law under which the patent was issued ... this
[riparian water] right incident to the soil was reserved by the
government, to be held in trust for the public ... . 04
Thus, the Desert Land Act severed water from land so that subse-
quent federal patents carried no riparian rights. Furthermore, the
court concluded that the Act was intended to establish "a uniform
rule."'0 5 After the passage of the Act, all lands in the desert-land
states10 6 "were accepted with the implied understanding that . . .
the first to appropriate and use the water for the purposes specified
in the act should have the superior right thereto."'0 7
The Oregon theory thus had two elements. First, the Desert
Land Act severed land and water by providing that federal patent-
ees acquire title only to land and not to water rights. Second, the
only method for obtaining water rights in the desert-land states was
through an appropriation under state law. Moreover, because Con-
gress had decided that the only method for obtaining water rights
was through an appropriation under state law, the national govern-
ment also had to obtain its water rights by appropriation under state
law. 
1 0 8
102 1d. at 1091-92.
103 Ch. 107, 19 Stat. at 377.
104 Hough, 98 P. at 1092.
1
0 5 Id. at 1091.
106 The Desert Land Act applied only to Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. 43 U.S.C. § 323.
1
0
7 Hough, 98 P. at 1095.
108 In an opinion handed down shortly after Hough was decided, the United States
Supreme Court, while expressly declining to decide the issue, stated that the Hough





LAND/STATE LAW: THE ACCOMMODATION
The United States Supreme Court did not again address the rela-
tionship between state-law prior appropriation interests and the
Property Clause until 1935 when it decided California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 109 Plaintiff, a riparian
landowner whose title derived from an 1885 federal patent, sought
to enjoin defendant from constructing a power plant that would di-
vert at least part of the flow of the Rogue River away from plain-
tiff's land. The plaintiff argued that the diversion was an
infringement of its asserted rights as a riparian landowner.110 The
threshold question thus was whether the federal patent conveyed
riparian water rights to plaintiff.
The Court began by recapitulating the myth of the sturdy emi-
grant. The prior appropriation doctrine arose, the Court stated, as
customary law that recognized priority as the basis of rights to ex-
ploit natural resources located on the public domain. This custom-
ary law had received "formal confirmation" in the Acts of 1866 and
1870.' Even if these two statutes "did not constitute an entire
abandonment of the common-law rule of running waters in so far as
the public lands and subsequent grantees ... were concerned, they
foreshadowed the more positive declarations of the Desert Land
Act of 1877,"' 112 which, the Court held,
effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not
theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.... [Therefore] a
patent issued thereafter for lands in a desert-land state or terri-
tory, under any of the land laws of the United States, carried
with it, of its own force, no common law right to the water flow-
ing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed.
1 13
Moreover, "to further the disposition and settlement of the public
domain,""' 4 the Act established a uniform rule: "[F]or the future
the land should be patented separately; and that all non-navigable
waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under
the laws of the states."'1 5 Finally:
109 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
'1
0 Id. at 151-52.
111 Id. at 154-55.
112 Id. at 155.
113 Id. at 158.
114Id. at 161.
115 Id. at 162.
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If it be conceded that in the absence of federal legislation the
state would be powerless to affect the riparian rights of the
United States or its grantees, still, the authority of Congress to
vest such power in the state, and that it has done so by the legis-
lation to which we have referred, cannot be doubted.
16
Congress' grant of power to the desert-land states was, however,
only permissive: "What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if
not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public do-
main became publicijuris, subject to the plenary control of the des-
ignated states .... ,117 Thus, the desert-land states had the power
to determine the system of water rights that would exist within their
boundaries.
By implication, the Court upheld the Oregon theory of federal-
state relations; the Desert Land Act severed water rights from the
land so that federal patents issued after 1877 carried no riparian
rights." 8 Moreover, by granting desert-land states "plenary con-
trol" over the nature of water rights within their respective bounda-
ries, Congress had created a uniform rule. Given the sweep of the
Court's language, it is perhaps understandable that the Court's iter-
ation of an earlier qualification-that a state could not destroy the
riparian rights of the United States' 9-went largely unnoticed.
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court reemphasized the na-
tional propriety interest in riparian rights. Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Oregon 12o arose from a challenge by the State of Oregon to a
license issued by the Federal Power Commission authorizing Port-
land General Electric Company to construct a hydroelectric project
on the Deschutes River in central Oregon. The State contended
that the company was required to obtain a state water right, basing
its arguments on the Oregon theory seemingly ratified by the
Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Beginning with the proposition
that the project was located on federal reserved lands rather than
116 Id.
1 17 .d at 163-64.
118 See also Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937):
The federal government, as owner of the public domain, had the power to
dispose of the land and water composing it together or separately; and by the
Desert Land Act of 1877... if not before, Congress had severed the land and
waters constituting the public domain and established the rule that for the
future the lands should be patented separately.
119 California Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 159 (quoting United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706 (1899)).
120 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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public lands,' 2' the Court concluded that it was not necessary to
determine whether the three statutes constituted the "express dele-
gation or conveyance of power that is claimed by the State, because
these Acts are not applicable to the reserved lands and water here
involved." 122  The Desert Land Act, the Court noted, "covers
'sources of water supply upon the public lands ..... The lands
before us in this case are not 'public lands' but 'reservations.' "123
While the Court did not expressly cite the language of Rio
Grande Dam and California Oregon Power Co., its conclusion re-
states the limitation initially expressed in those cases:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress ... a State
could not by its legislation destroy the right of the United States
as the owner of lands bordering on a stream to the continued
flow-so far, at least, as might be necessary for the beneficial use
of the government property .... 124
CONCLUSION
ACCOMMODATION AS THESIS
In a dialogue extending over more than a century, the national
and state judiciaries crafted an accommodation that both reflects
their respective interests and remains within the bounds of the Con-
stitution. The need to recognize local "peculiarities" of soil and cli-
mate, 25 clothed in the language of the "equal footing" doctrine,
1 26
121 The land at the eastern end of the dam had been reserved for power purposes in
1909. See id. at 439. The western end of the dam was located on lands within the
Warm Springs Indian Reservation established by treaty in 1855. See Treaty between
the United States and the Confederated tribes and bands of Indians of Middle Oregon,
June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963, 964. Lands within the reservation had been reserved as
power sites under the authority of the Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 13, 36 Stat. 855,
858, repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792. The power site reservation took place in 1910 and
1913. See Federal Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. at 438 n.5.
122 Federal Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. at 448.
123 Id. (quoting § 1, 19 Stat. at 377).
124 California Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 159 (citing United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)).
125 See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1905).
126See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) (states entered into the
Union with "full powers of local sovereignty which belonged to other states"); see also
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. at 703 (states have the power to legislate for
their own interests until Congress "in some way ... asserts its superior power"). The
equal footing doctrine simply requires that "new states have the same rights, sover-
eignty, and jurisdiction ... as the original states." Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 230 (1845); see also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892) ("There
can be no distinction between the several States of the Union in the character of the
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served to justify the state power to replace the common-law riparian
water rights with the prior appropriation doctrine; 27 state law, in
other words, defines the boundaries and content of private property
located within the state's borders. 128 At the same time, the national
interest precludes a state from divesting the national government of
its rights as a proprietor.1 29 State-created interests are limited by
national lands.
The dialogue between the state and national courts focused on
the line between these interests. State assertion of authority to de-
fine the nature of federal proprietary interests was rejected1 30 in
favor of a rule cobbled together from three national statutes in
which Congress had made only passing reference to water. By
treating the General Mining Law and the Desert Land Act as sever-
ing "all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropri-
ated, from the land itself,"1 31 the courts arrived at this rule: The
severance of land and water applies only to public lands and state
jurisdiction, sovereignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise over per-
sons and subjects within their respective limits."); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 423, 436 (1867).
127 Each state "may determine for itself whether the common law rule in respect to
riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the
appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress cannot
enforce either rule upon any State." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 94; see also Con-
necticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) ("[E]very State is free to change its
laws governing riparian ownership and to permit the appropriation of flowing waters for
such purposes as it may deem wise."); Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511-12
(1905) ("It is the settled rule that the question of the title of a riparian owner is one of
local law.").
128 State law fully applies only after the federal government has disposed of all of its
interest in a particular tract. See Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839).
Stated from the opposite perspective, federal law applies to land (1) if federal law is the
basis for a claim of right, or (2) if the national government has not completely divested
itself of a particular tract. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 377 (1977); see also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,
669-71 (1979). Thus, the mere fact that title to property ultimately is traceable to a
federal patent does not give rise to a federal question. E.g., Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201
U.S. 332 (1906); De Lamar's Nev. Gold Mining Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U.S. 523, 527
(1900); cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1973)
("aberrant or hostile state rules" will not be applied to determine federal interests);
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1922) (changes in
state law may not destroy interest vested before statehood).
129 E.g., Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 446-47
(1839).
130 Compare Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) with Sturr v. Beck,
133 U.S. 541, 552 (1890).
131 California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158
(1935).
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law is, therefore, inapplicable "to the use of waters on reservations
of the United States."13 2 When lands are federally reserved for a
particular purpose, those lands have riparian rights "so far at least
as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government prop-
erty." '133 As with other federal interests, the existence and scope of
federal reserved water rights are questions of congressional
intent. 134
In a dynamic system, every accommodation becomes merely a
thesis for further examination, a point of departure for the next
round of cases. There is no reason, therefore, to assume that the
current accommodation is a final conclusion.'
3
1
132 Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955); see also Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976); United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520,
523 (1971) ("The federally reserved lands include any federal enclave."). For examples
of "federally reserved lands," see United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698-99
(1978) (national forest); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1975) (national monu-
ments); United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971) (national forest); Ari-
zona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963) (Indian reservation, national forests,
national recreation areas); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1939) (Indian
reservation); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (same).
133 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
Applying state law-including its water law-to retained federal lands "would place the
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." Cam-
field v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897). Such a result is, of course, contrary to
the fundamental structure of the federal system. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819).
134 In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a
federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government in-
tended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred
if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses for which the reservation was created.
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 139.
135 E.g., State Water Resources Control Bd. v. United States, 749 P.2d 324 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (recognizing federal riparian water rights in national
forest lands under state law); State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988) (state approval
of federal water right for in situ water uses including recreation and wildlife watering).
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